Bringing Elon to a knife fight
Wishing for a more orderly disruption may misunderstand the nature of government reform
DOGE has made it both impossible not to talk about government reform, and impossible to talk about it. The topic is everywhere, but the subject is now entirely eclipsed on the left by the horror of who has been assigned the task and the need to decry DOGE as a bad faith effort. Elon wants to launch his rockets without government interference, Vivek wants to gut the civil service, both want to cater to cronies. I am being told on the socials that anyone engaging in discussion of how to shape this effort or what good it could potentially bring is enabling the ambitions of an autocracy. The problem itself, barely legible to Dems before DOGE, is off the table again.
But we do need to talk about government reform, and while I’m sorry the conditions are quite a bit less than ideal, I think it's time we admitted they were always going to be. Democrats did not do this work. Many wonderful public servants made valiant efforts and scored some great wins, but Democratic leadership did not make it a top priority to clear out the underbrush that jams the gears of government. Elon’s ambitions should not serve as cover for Dems to continue to abdicate responsibility here. Until we know more about what DOGE is planning, I support Dems like Ro Khanna for pledging to work with them.
I am guessing that those most worried that DOGE will succeed have never tried their hand at reforming government. It’s hard. But easier, you say, with no respect for the law, and the DOGE team will be unencumbered by such details. But that’s not true. The lawsuits will come. A lot of the government tech community is skipping the hand wringing; they've basically just grabbed a bag of popcorn and are watching in real time as Elon and Vivek learn all the things they’ve known, lived, and absolutely hated for their entire time in public service. They don’t see DOGE as their savior, but they are feeling vindicated after years of shouting into the void. I am struck by how different the tone of the DOGE conversation is between political leaders on the left and the people who’ve been fighting in the implementation trenches. One group is terrified they’ll succeed. The other is starting to ask a surprising question (or at least I am): What if even billionaires can’t disrupt the system we have built?
Take the issue of respect for the law. Put aside the headline grabbing issues for a second and live in the mundane world of implementation in government. If you’ve spent the past ten years trying to make, say, better online services for veterans, or clearer ways to understand your Medicare benefits, or even better ways to support warfighters, you’ve sat in countless -– and I mean countless — meetings where you’ve been told that something you were trying to do was illegal. Was it? Now, instead of launching your new web form or doing the user research your team needed to do, you spend weeks researching why you are now branded as dangerously lawless, only to find that either a) it was absolutely not illegal but 25 years ago someone wrote a memo that has since been interpreted as advising against this thing, b) no one had heard of the thing you were trying to do (the cloud, user research, A/B testing) and didn’t understand what you were talking about so had simply asserted it was illegal out of fear, c) there was an actual provision in law somewhere that did seem to address this and interpreting it required understanding both the actual intent of the law and the operational mechanics of the thing you were trying to do, which actually matched up pretty well or d) (and this one is uncommon) that the basic, common sense thing you were trying to do was actually illegal, which was clearly the result of a misunderstanding by policymakers or the people who draft legislation and policy on their behalf, and if they understood how their words had been operationalized, they’d be horrified. It is absolutely possible to both respect the rule of law, considering the democratic process and the peaceful transfer of power sacred, and have developed an aversion to the fetishization of law that perverts its intent. The majority of public servants I know have well earned this right.
DOGE is about to crash into this wall of weaponization of the complexities of law, policy, regulation, process, and lore in defense of the status quo and yes, the people in my community are watching. While our eyes are on potential abuses, they are also on the durability of the wall generally, and with deeply mixed emotions. It must be said: the wall is a problem. It is a problem for people who value the rule of law. It is a problem for people who care about an effective, responsive government.
A few kind and well-meaning folks have suggested that I should be in charge of DOGE. The way they see it, if only someone with my values and knowledge of the situation were given the same power that Elon and Vivek have been given this would all be good. Yes, I have spent fifteen years studying roughly the same problem DOGE is now attacking (framed differently, but even I have framed it differently over the years.) But a wish for someone like me to be in charge misunderstands the nature of the problem. Diagnosis we have. The power to change we do not. Billionaires are in charge now because they have power. Elon in particular has what Ezra Klein correctly ascribed to Trump, which is lack of inhibition. Normal people like me get scared and ashamed when we’re told we’re doing something illegal. Elon does not. I wish it were different, but perhaps the job of breaking the wall has ended up with someone who is suited to doing it. The norms that constrain even people with far more power than I have make it very difficult to break through that wall.
It’s not that Dems haven’t tried the billionaire move. Obama’s Secretary of Defense Ash Carter started the Defense Innovation Board and appointed Eric Schmidt to lead it, for example. Carter’s hope was to transform the military into a modern, effective (and dare I say efficient) institution, and saw Schmidt as extra firepower for change, so to speak. Many grumped about the unaccountable power Schmidt would have, but I served on that board for four years and that concern was laughable. The DIB did a lot of great work that Eric should be proud of (I am), but it was merely advisory, set up according to Federal Advisory Committee Act rules. It didn’t help that the board quickly attracted at least one gadfly ethics-watcher, whose objections to Eric’s actions were so nitpicky and procedural she represented the worst of the Pentagon, the worst of public service, the worst of accountability. In the end, she was an annoying speed bump, but it didn’t matter. We wrote papers that said things like “the Pentagon already knows everything in this paper, but seems unable to act on it,” and watched as the Pentagon appeared to technically act on recommendations without fundamentally changing much. Other efforts like DIUx made real progress, but the dent in the machine is still tiny. I admire what Eric did on DIB. But the presence of a billionaire is certainly no guarantee of change. Mike Bloomberg has the job now, and is still proving the point. Today, we spend even more to get even less deterrence.
It's really hard to have an accurate model for why change is so hard in large bureaucratic institutions, and specifically for public sector ones, where the differences in governance really do matter. On the one hand, I do still believe that the first order problem is simply lack of attention by people with power. If politics and policy take their fair share of your oxygen, there's really just very little left for the implementation. What is available gets used on getting that particular thing done, which usually means a hack around the system instead of permanently changing it so it can be easy next time. At its worst, the hacks to get it done this time actually make it harder on an ongoing basis.
But it's not as if mere attention would solve the problem. There are entrenched interests for the status quo. It's easy to imagine these as exclusively or even mostly commercial interests, but if that were true, why would it take three years to issue guidance as anodyne as the hiring memo the Biden Administration put out this summer? Among other provisions, it declared job titles could now be listed accurately (you could say it was a software developer instead of an IT specialist) and that you could now share “certs” of candidates who qualified for positions across agencies — but only under certain circumstances, and it’s still not widely done, so we mostly lose good applicants because they apply for one position and aren’t considered for others. These and a few other changes took a smart, dedicated, caring team three years to get done. I celebrated with the people responsible because it was a huge accomplishment for them. I am grateful to them and proud of them. I am not proud of the system in which that was a huge accomplishment.
Is someone against these minor and helpful changes? You could say that the vendors profit from government’s slow and poor process for hiring, but I struggle to imagine this was high on any lobbyists’ target lists. It's far more likely that there is just a perplexing combination of legitimate and imagined reasons for caution, and review by a staggering array of stakeholders. As I talked about in my book, outsiders (and certainly the right) imagine dangerously concentrated power in the executive branch, and seek to limit it. The reality is shockingly diffuse power. The bad outcomes they are fighting to prevent — burdensome, overreaching government — are the product of exactly the conditions they help create. Neither the left nor the right really has the mental models (nor, perhaps the desire) to effectively challenge the status quo of the technocracy.
But I don't want to dismiss the difficulty of confronting commercial interests. I think it’s fair to say that in the time I’ve been working on this issue we haven’t really seen the vendor ecosystem threatened in any meaningful way. The supplier base for government tech, for example, is not all that different from when I started Code for America in 2010. Anduril has made strides at the DoD for sure, and some startups have done some interesting stuff. Companies like Nava, a public benefit corporation whose costs and outcomes in contracting with agencies like CMS and VA should make it a strong choice across civilian government, is now over 500 people. But CGI Federal, just to pick one of the incumbents, is 90,000. Lockheed Martin is 122,000. Anduril is 3,500. It’s not like we’ve seen some massive shakeup.
You can tell a credible story about the resistance to change that doesn’t require any dirty tricks on the part of the incumbents, and I’ve often left it at that, in part because the vendors don’t come at me. I don’t threaten them. But they do go at those who do threaten them. Oracle recently admitted to some very dirty tricks in trying to keep their competitors from winning the Jedi cloud contract at the DoD. (More to say about this in a future post, perhaps. Or perhaps I’ll be too scared to attract their ire. It happens.) It’s not that they succeeded in getting the contract — they’d already lost it. They were just following their scorched earth policy of ensuring that if they couldn’t have it, no one could. And by no one, they meant their competitors, but the result is that the DoD still doesn’t have the access to the cloud that Jedi architect Chris Lynch envisioned. Our national defense is that much slower and less secure because Oracle can’t lose. These are some of the conditions under which change in government is supposed to take place.
We can wish that the government efficiency agenda were in the hands of someone else, but let’s not pretend that change was going to come from Democrats if they’d only had another term, and let’s not delude ourselves that change was ever going to happen politely, neatly, carefully. However we got here, we may now be in a Godzilla vs Kong world. Perhaps we’re about to get a natural experiment in which Elonzilla faces off with Larry ElliKong. One of the things we need to be ready to learn is that Elonzilla could lose. Or worse, since Elon and Larry are friends, the expected disruptive could get co-opted. And what would that say about the problem? Conjuring Elon is not bringing a gun to a knife fight. It was never a knife fight.
Having spent 15 years in civil service, I find a lot in this post to agree with. It is much, much too hard to do things in federal government. And I learn a lot from all your posts.
But I would urge you to take seriously the role of the courts in creating this mess. There are bad lawyers. But the good ones often are warning the agency about real hazards that can waste enormous amounts of agency effort. Go read a regulatory preamble from the 1970s. It’s a hoot. The agencies often took a few pages to say “here’s what we’re doing”, offered a minimal justification, and that was it. Now, a rulemaking is a multiyear saga, as the agencies jump through every hoop, and know the courts are at the end of the gauntlet. A lawyer who doesn’t warn the program staff what can happen if, say, you end up in front of a judge in ND Tex, is not doing their job. If you don’t document everything to the nth degree you are going to have to do it again. Period. An agency can spend hundreds of pages documenting its reasons, but if the court doesn’t like the way it handled a few comments? Do it over.
Maybe more importantly, recent cases are have made it so easy to sue - and to reopen longsettled decisions - that it’s almost malpractice if the private bar doesn’t tell their clients to sue. Was an agency rule upheld 15 years ago by a court that gave the agency Chevron deference? Find a business willing to serve as name plaintiff and sue - this time the agency gets no deference - and statute of limitations isn’t even a problem.
I don’t know who is tracking this, or how, but I’ll be shocked if there isn’t a rapid increase in litigation challenges - which takes up massive amounts of staff time and makes everybody more cautious. Don’t even get me started on the other signals courts have sent about where they might go. A lot of uncertainty raises transaction costs.
I’m not saying it’s the answer to go back to the 1970s. That was excessive the other way. But the courts are a deeply entrenched, massively powerful force that will create more and more and more transactional costs unless they are compelled to change. Don’t want scared bureaucrats who triple-check everything and write impossibly burdensome memos? Do something about the courts. If things stay as they are, and staff is cut, just wait and see how slow and ossified the govt is going to be - you ain’t seen nothin’ yet.
Sometimes, as a middle manager in a large organization, it helps to have a new guy come in, who's obviously a big jerk. Then you can kill that project which the people on your team love but it is taking half of your budget and you know it's never going to achieve any results. And blame the new guy, of course.